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ARTICLES
REGULATING THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
Donna M. Nagy*
Today in the United States, nearly ninety-five million people,
comprising more than half of all U.S. households, invest in mutual funds
either directly or through retirement plans.1 In April 2006, the total net
assets of U.S. mutual funds hit a record high of nearly $9.5 trillion, held in
8,008 separate funds.2 By way of comparison, in 1980, there were
combined assets of approx-imately $135 billion in 564 funds.3 As these
numbers reflect, the growth in the mutual fund industry over the last
twenty-five years has been explosive.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), however, has not
seen the budgetary increases that would have enabled it to stay in pace with
the mutual fund industry. In the 1980s, the SEC sounded what became a
perennial alarm as to its inability to keep up with industry growth and the
consequent compromise to the effectiveness of its investment company
inspection program.4 Self-regulation was proposed as a possible solution,
* C. Ben Dutton Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Law–
Bloomington. This article was prepared for the Symposium on New Models for Securities Law
Enforcement: Outsourcing, Compelled Cooperation, and Gatekeeping, sponsored by the Brooklyn
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, in partnership with the Securities and
Exchange Commission Historical Society, on March 31, 2006. I am grateful to my research
assistant Matthew Kitchen and to Professor Roberta Karmel for inviting me to participate in the
Symposium. I also appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from Professors Jill E. Fisch,
Tamar Frankel, Howell E. Jackson, and Margaret V. Sachs.
1. See Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) [hereinafter Trading
Abuses Hearing] (statement of Robert J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community
Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
2. Investment Company Institute, Trends In Mutual Fund Investing: April 2006 (May 30,
2006), http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/trends_04_06.html [hereinafter Trends In Mutual Fund
Investing]. Mutual funds are by far the most common type of investment company, and large
groups of mutual fund portfolios under the operation of a common investment adviser or sponsor
are generally referred to as investment company or mutual fund “complexes.” The SEC oversees
approximately 900 complexes. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Lori
A. Richards, Director, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations).
3. Mutual Fund Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunication and Finance
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 138 (1993) (statement of Arthur Levitt,
SEC Chairman) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Industry Hearing]. In 1940, when the Investment
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act were enacted, there were a grand total of 68
mutual funds in operation. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND
MARKETS: COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION 8 (1990).
4. See, e.g., McGrath Warns SEC May Use States, NASD to Oversee Advisers, Due to
Budget Woes, 21 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 449 (1989) (bemoaning the lack of funding and
stating that investment companies and advisers “are being inspected less frequently” (quoting
Kathryn McGrath, then director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management)).
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and from time to time throughout the next two decades, the SEC, Congress,
and industry participants considered various proposals.5 Yet, for a variety of
reasons—including the mutual fund industry’s relatively unblemished
regulatory record and its claim to an extraordinarily high level of public
confidence—none of these proposals resulted in the creation of a mutual
fund self-regulatory organization (SRO).
Concerns about the adequacy of mutual fund oversight reached new
heights in the wake of the market timing and late trading scandals first
brought to public attention by New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer in 2003.6 Following closely on the heels of the Enron and
WorldCom accounting scandals that gave rise to the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), these mutual fund
trading abuse scandals prompted renewed calls for restructured mutual fund
regulation.7 And while proposals for statutory self-regulation modeled on
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) continue to be advanced for the mutual fund
industry,8 even more attention is now being focused on the PCAOB’s model
of “private” independent regulation.9
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See Laura Johannes et al., Fraud Charges Widen Scope of Scandal Facing Mutual Funds,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at C1; Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Alleges Mutual
Funds Allowed Fraudulent Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at A1; Deborah Solomon et al.,
Milestone for ‘Timing’ Scandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at C1 (providing a scandal “time
line” that commences with Spitzer’s charges against Canary Capital on September 3, 2003). See
also William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2006) (“Prior to Spitzer’s announcement,
investment advisers . . . had enjoyed general approbation for the way in which they ran their
businesses.”).
7. While the importance of the mutual fund trading abuse scandals, as well as the extent and
effects of the wrongdoing, is certainly open to debate, see, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Do the Mutuals
Need More Law?, 27 REG. 14 (2004); Henry G. Manne, What Mutual Fund Scandal?, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 8, 2004, at A22; see also Mercer Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading,
Fund Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV 1271,
1274 (2006) (arguing that the SEC has “misunderstood the true nature of the scandal” and overreacted to occurrences of frequent trading while under-reacting to the problem of fund arbitrage),
few would dispute that the scandals provided advocates for change with a powerful rhetorical
vehicle. Indeed, as Professor Jonathan Macey has observed, “public policy crises, whether real or
imagined, provide an opportunity for entrepreneurial politicians and regulators to break the typical
log-jams that make it more difficult to pass new rules during times of ordinary politics.” Jonathan
R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
117, 118 (2005). Some of the calls for restructured mutual fund regulation were likely directed to
this “policy window.” See id. at 137–38 (emphasizing “the need for federal officials to appear to
be ‘doing something’ . . . in the wake of the scandals . . .” uncovered by Eliot Spitzer).
8. See Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies be Subject to a New Statutory SelfRegulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1126 (2005) (“[A new SRO] could augment
investment company boards, help investment companies themselves receive more rulemaking
attention from the SEC, and, most significantly, help avoid the type of scandals that recently have
besmirched the reputations of so many mutual fund families.”). See also American Enterprise
Institute, Former SEC Division Directors Give Their Views on Regulatory Reform (Feb. 28,
2006), http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1264/transcript.asp (moderated roundtable
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This article contends that while the regulatory regime for mutual funds
could certainly be improved, the substitution of a private entity for the SEC
as the industry’s primary overseer is not the answer. Indeed, private
regulation does not hold the solution for strengthening the oversight of
mutual funds, whether along the lines of the PCAOB’s model of
independent regulation or the self-regulatory models of the NASD and
NYSE. Rather, assuming that further study demonstrates the desirability of
more frequent and/or more comprehensive inspections of mutual funds and
their advisers, Congress should infuse the SEC with the resources necessary
to accomplish that end. This undertaking could be funded through any
number of avenues.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
the mutual fund industry and its regulatory landscape. Part II focuses on
private regulation and concludes that neither the PCAOB’s model of
independent regulation nor the NASD and NYSE’s model of self-regulation
is appropriate for the mutual fund industry. Part III explores how to
improve the regulatory regime for the mutual fund industry and advances a
number of suggestions.
I. THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY AND ITS REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE
A. THE CURRENT REGIME
The mutual fund industry continues to thrive despite the bevy of
scandals revealed to the investing public in 2003 and 2004, at least by the
measures of total assets under management ($9.485 trillion as of April
2006) and new dollars invested (more than $500 billion in the first four

featuring four former directors of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management). Among other
questions, the following was posed at the beginning of the program: “Should there be a selfregulatory organization for mutual funds [modeled on] . . . the NASD, and if so, what functions
should it perform?” Id. at 1–2. For the view that an SRO for mutual funds “would substitute a
weaker enforcement regime by an SRO for a stronger regime by the SEC,” see Tamar Frankel,
Should Funds and Investment Advisers Establish a Self-Regulatory Organization?, in THE
FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING ROLES OF BANKS,
MUTUAL FUNDS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES 447, 453 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1997).
9. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201, 149
CONG. REC. 15,977, 15,984 (2003) (introducing legislation from Senators Thomas Daschle,
Edward Kennedy, and John Kerry that, among other things, would have established a “Mutual
Fund Oversight Board” modeled after the PCAOB); Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for
Investors? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises of the H.R. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 157–58 (2003)
[hereinafter Looking Out for Investors Hearing] (statement of Professor Mercer Bullard)
(recommending that Congress create a Mutual Fund Oversight Board). But see Donna M. Nagy,
Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 975, 1069–71 (2005) (arguing that Congress should resist the temptation to
replicate the PCAOB model in other areas, including the mutual fund industry).
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months of 2006).10 Although late trading and market timing scandals
captured the lion’s share of publicity, many other illegal practices were
unearthed during this time period including those involving unpaid breakpoint discounts,11 mispriced assets,12 and undisclosed revenue-sharing with
broker-dealers.13
The response to the mutual fund scandals at the federal level was
swift.14 Although political pundits predicted the passage of mutual fund
legislation in the wake of the scandals, Congress opted instead for a “wait
and see” approach to evaluate the results of the SEC’s unprecedented
efforts toward industry reform.15 Accordingly, proposals for private sector
regulation of the mutual fund industry must be assessed in light of the
regulatory regime described below.
1. The Statutory Framework
Mutual funds are regulated under each of the four principal securities
laws: the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act),16 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act),17 the Investment Advisers Act

10. See Trends in Mutual Fund Investing, supra note 2, at 1. However, empirical research
shows that the market timing and late trading scandals affected investor behavior: investors
penalized both the funds that were involved in the scandals, and to a lesser extent the fund
complexes, “by making statistically and economically significant withdrawals.” Stephen J. Choi &
Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 1 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-07), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =877896.
11. Broker-Dealers: 15 Firms to Pay $21.5M, Resolving SEC, NASD Charges over
Breakpoints, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 329, 329 (Feb. 23, 2004).
12. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: SEC Inspections Staff Refers Fund Cases Involving
Fair Value Pricing to Enforcement, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 801 (May 3, 2004); Press
Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Levels Fraud Charges Against Heartland Advisors, Inc., 12
Company Officials and Others for Misrepresentations, Mispricing and Insider Trading in Two
High Yield Bond Funds (Dec. 11, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003171.htm.
13. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: SEC Enforcement Energy Goes into Probes of
Broker-Dealers’, Funds’ Revenue-Sharing, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 97 (Jan. 19, 2004);
Richard Hill, Mutual Funds: NASD Running ‘Sweep’ Into Fund Payments to B-DS; Dems. Agree
to Change Funds Bill, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1918 (Nov. 17, 2003).
14. See Brooke Masters, A Year of Charges, Reforms for Funds: Regulators Imposed Fines,
Crafted New Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at E1.
15. See Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: Donaldson, Shelby on Same Wave Length: SEC Able
to Handle Mutual Fund Reforms, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 661 (Apr. 12, 2004) (quoting
Senate Banking Chairman Richard Shelby’s statement that the SEC is “showing a lot of leadership
and resolve. . . . We don’t want to do anything that would be construed in any way as undermining
what the SEC is doing.”).
16. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a to 77bbbb) (providing that all public offerings of securities, including shares sold by
mutual funds, must adhere to the registration provisions in Section 5 of the Securities Act).
17. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78mm) (providing broad anti-fraud provisions and regulating the brokerdealers and underwriters involved with the distribution and sale of mutual fund shares).
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of 1940 (the Advisers Act),18 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
‘40 Act).19 Often described as the most complex of these laws,20 the ‘40 Act
was enacted specifically to regulate mutual funds and other types of
investment companies as well as the investment advisers who manage
them.21
The statutory scheme in the ‘40 Act requires mutual funds to register
with the SEC,22 mandates extensive disclosure,23 and, because disclosure
alone was viewed as insufficiently protective of shareholder interests,24
imposes a vast array of highly specific substantive requirements and
prohibitions. These requirements and prohibitions include those that relate
to mutual funds and their capital structure,25 the composition and structure
of their boards of directors,26 the types of transactions in which they can
engage (including a near outright ban on transactions with affiliates),27 and
the diversification of their investments among different industries.28
However, to mitigate some of the harshness of these provisions, the ‘40 Act
gave the SEC broad authority to exempt investment companies and
advisers—conditionally or unconditionally—from virtually any statutory
requirement or prohibition.29 The ‘40 Act also gave the SEC broad authority
to issue rules imposing additional regulatory requirements.30
18. See generally Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 stat. 847 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000)) (requiring registration of all investment advisers to
mutual funds (except banks, which are regulated separately), imposing recordkeeping, reporting,
and disclosure requirements, containing broad anti-fraud provisions, and imposing on investment
advisers a general fiduciary duty to the clients they serve).
19. See generally Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)).
20. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 262–64 (3d ed. 1998)
(attributing the ‘40 Act’s complexity to the “different types of companies it covers and the
intricacies of the problems it presents”). Professor Jerry Markham accords the 1940 Act an even
more dubious distinction, rendering it the “world’s most complex statute.” Jerry W. Markham,
Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 326 n.34 (2003).
21. See supra note 19.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (2000) (providing that unless it is registered with the SEC pursuant to
Section 8 of the ‘40 Act, an investment company may not engage in any business in interstate
commerce or use the mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to offer for sale any
security).
23. Id. § 80a-29 (requiring periodic reports to be filed with the SEC and disseminated to
shareholders).
24. See TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS § 1.02[B][2][b] (2d ed. 2006 Supp.) (“In many respects, investment companies are
like banks, insurance companies and pension funds, all of which are regulated not only by
disclosure but also by substantive regulation.”).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (2000).
26. Id. § 80a-10 (2000).
27. Id. § 80a-17(a), (d), (e) (2000).
28. Id. § 80a-12 (2000).
29. Id. § 80a-6(c) (2000). A leading treatise notes that the SEC’s broad exemptive powers
“allowed the SEC to impose conditions that became the new set of rules for the industry” and that
“[t]his method allowed for an adjustment of the Act piecemeal by orders, and then by Rules,
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As Congress envisioned, the SEC’s role in regulating mutual funds is
substantial. In addition to its broad exemptive and rulemaking authority, the
SEC has the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the ‘40 Act’s
provisions and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. In
furtherance of this end, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (OCIE) conducts periodic inspections of mutual funds and
their investment advisers.31 When these inspections reveal serious regulatory violations, or when regulatory violations are otherwise suspected, the
Division of Enforcement can initiate investigations.32 If warranted, the
Division may seek Commission authorization for the initiation of enforcement actions which may be brought in federal court or in administrative
proceedings.33
As the principal regulator for broker-dealers, the NASD also plays a
limited role in mutual fund regulation. Specifically, broker-dealers who sell
mutual funds must comply with NASD rules pertaining to sales practices
and advertising, and are subject to periodic examinations and inspections by
the NASD staff. Broker-dealers who violate these rules or the federal
securities laws are subject to discipline by the NASD.
The statutory framework further places considerable supervisory responsibilities on a mutual fund’s board of directors, particularly
independent (or disinterested) directors.34 Among other responsibilities,
directors are charged with initial approval and periodic review of the mutual
fund’s investment advisory and distribution contracts (including the fees
charged for these services).35 These contacts must be reviewed annually and
must be approved by a majority of the fund’s independent directors.
Federal courts are, of course, the ultimate arbiter of whether mutual
funds, and those who direct and advise them, have complied with their
statutory obligations. In addition to statutory provisions that authorize both

without resort to legislation.” FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[B][2]. However, it
goes on to note that approximately every ten years, Congress reviews the Act and “in most cases,
codif[ies] the SEC’s exemptive rules, sometimes with changes.” Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-38 (2000).
31. Investment companies and investment advisers are required to maintain records for
examination by the SEC. See id. § 80a-30 (2000).
32. The Enforcement Division may initiate informal investigations on its own accord. But
formal investigations, pursuant to which enforcement staff may subpoena documents and
testimony, may only be initiated with approval by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2006).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(d) (Supp. II 2002) (injunctive actions); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-9(f) (West
2006) (cease and desist orders).
34. See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market
Volatility: What Regulation By the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 915 (2005) (noting that Congress structured the Investment Company
Act in a way that positioned “the disinterested directors in the role of watchdogs to act as an
independent check on the management of the investment company”).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (2000).
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criminal36 and civil monetary penalties,37 the ‘40 Act provides an express
private right of action for breaches of fiduciary duty involving
compensation and fees paid by mutual funds to their advisers or affiliated
persons.38 Although courts traditionally recognized implied rights of action
under various statutory provisions, a number of recent decisions have held
that the ‘40 Act does not give rise to causes of action that are merely
implied from the statutory text.39
2. Recent Regulatory Reforms
That the mutual fund scandals were first unearthed by the New York
State Attorney General’s Office and not the SEC, the agency principally
charged with enforcing the federal securities laws, gave the SEC much to
answer for.40 The question “where was the SEC?” was posed repeatedly by
members of Congress,41 in newspaper editorials,42 and in scholarly com-

36. See id. § 80a-48 (2000) (stating that willful violations of the ‘40 Act are punishable by
fines and up to five years in prison).
37. Id. § 80a-41.
38. Id. § 80a-36(b).
39. See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1025 (2005) (discussing several implied rights of action, but noting the
recent “lively debate” over whether any private rights of action should be implied under the 1940
Act). See also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation Under
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 262 (2005)
(discussing implied rights of action under the 1940 Act).
40. Based on a survey sent to mutual fund complexes shortly after Spitzer’s revelations, the
SEC estimated that approximately half of the eighty-eight largest mutual funds had undisclosed
arrangements with favored clients that allowed these shareholders to engage in market timing that
contravened publicly stated policies regarding short term trading. See Looking Out for Investors
Hearing, supra note 9, at 11–12 (testimony of Stephen Cutler, Director, SEC Division of
Enforcement). Surveys to the 34 largest broker-dealers revealed that more than 25% permitted
certain customers to place or confirm orders after 4:00 p.m. and receive the 4:00 p.m. net asset
value (NAV) price. Id.
41. See Stephen Labaton, Extensive Flaws at Mutual Funds Cited at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2003, at A1 (highlighting bipartisan criticism of the SEC’s failure to detect mutual fund
trading abuses).
42. See, e.g., Steve Bailey, Op-Ed., Asleep at the Switch, B. GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2003, at D1.
As the scandals roll out across Wall Street and beyond . . . the question “Where was the
Securities and Exchange Commission?” is becoming part of the lexicon. . . . It has been
left to New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to uncover one problem after another
in the securities business and to show the SEC and its boss, William Donaldson, what
regulation is all about.
Id. See also Editorial, Eliot Spitzer, Once Again, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 120.
Where is the [SEC] in this reform effort? . . . Why did it leave it to a state AG to
oversee the mutual-fund industry, just as it did with Wall Street research? . . . If
Washington doesn’t want 50 Eliot Spitzers making policy, it had better make sure the
SEC and Justice do their jobs.
Id.
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mentary.43 The question was also the principal focus of a report to Congress
prepared by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).44 Not
surprisingly, the SEC’s failure to detect the mutual fund trading abuses has
been attributed to a variety of factors, including inadequate resources and
inaccurate risk assessment by SEC staff, the latter due in part to the staff’s
mistaken belief that mutual fund complexes were being vigilant in selfpolicing frequent trading.45 Others have argued that the SEC, and more
particularly its Division of Investment Management, fell prey to the
problem of agency capture.46
Yet even the SEC’s critics would likely acknowledge that the SEC
placed a high priority on reform once it was alerted to the extent of the
trading abuses in the mutual fund industry.47 Specifically, the SEC
responded to the scandals with aggressive rulemaking, stepped-up
enforcement actions, and a revamped mutual fund inspection program that
revised examination techniques and significantly expanded the number of
examiners. The following sub-sections briefly explore each of these
regulatory reforms.

43. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where was the SEC When the Mutual Fund
Scandal Happened?, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2004, at 46, available at http://www.legal
affairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_coffee_marapr04.msp. See also Paul G. Mahoney,
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 177–78 (2004) (raising
important policy questions, including “why didn’t the Securities and Exchange Commission
discover the late trading and market timing abuses until they had apparently become
widespread?”).
44. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS
CAN BE LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE,
REP. NO. GAO-05-313 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05313.pdf
[hereinafter GAO Lessons Learned Report].
45. See id. at 11–12. (recognizing that the SEC faced “competing examination priorities and
had limited examination resources prior to September 2003” and noting that the SEC staff viewed
fund complexes as having “financial incentives to control frequent trading”).
46. See Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other
Practices that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the Financial Management, the Budget, and Int’l
Security Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov. Affairs, 108th Cong. 268 (2004) (statement of Professor
John P. Freeman) (arguing that the SEC’s Division of Investment Management “has become far
too deferential to the industry” and thus “presents a classic case of ‘regulatory capture’”). See also
Coffee, supra note 43, at 46 (“[A]dopting a profile of being tougher than the SEC may further
Spitzer’s political ambitions, but this does not mean that he is wrong to suggest that the SEC has
been too soft—that it has, to a degree, been ‘captured’ by the politically powerful mutual fund
industry.”); Macey, supra note 7, at 117–18 (“The SEC’s passivity” in areas including mutual
fund regulation “was likely caused by the agency’s capture by the same special interests it was
ostensibly regulating.”).
47. Some might contend that the principal impetus for reform was a need on the part of SEC
officials to restore the agency’s reputation as an effective regulator. See Jonathan R. Macey,
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance:
The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L REV. 951, 967 (2005) (“It is hardly
likely that the SEC’s neglect of the problems in the mutual fund industry would have ended so
suddenly without the pressure exerted by the New York Attorney General’s interest in the issue.”).
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a. Mutual Fund Rulemaking
Mutual fund initiatives were much on the minds of SEC officials after
the burst of the so-called high-tech bubble and the collapses of Enron and
WorldCom.48 But the pace of the SEC’s rulemaking agenda quickened substantially in the months following the public revelation of the late trading
and market timing scandals.
A principal component of the SEC’s rulemaking agenda involved the
tightening of internal controls and operations of mutual funds. Pursuant to
these new rules, investment companies and investment advisers registered
with the SEC are required to implement, review, and maintain “written
compliance policies and procedures designed to prevent, detect, and correct
compliance problems in key areas of their operations.”49 Mutual funds and
their advisers must also designate a chief compliance officer (CCO) who is
responsible for monitoring both the entity’s compliance with laws and
regulations and the entity’s own written policies and procedures.50 In addition, registered investment advisers must adopt written codes of ethics, a
mandate previously applicable only to investment companies.51
Other new rules were designed to enhance the governance structure of
mutual funds. The most important (and most controversial) of these governance rules required that in order for a mutual fund to avail itself of certain
SEC exemptions, the chairman of its board of directors and at least seventyfive percent of the board itself must be independent from the fund’s investment adviser.52 The new governance rules also condition exemptions on the
48. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s release on investment
company compliance programs, issued more than six months before the mutual fund scandals).
49. Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, SEC
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations); Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1(a)(1),
17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(1) (2006). See also Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and
Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003). The rules were effective as of Feb. 4,
2004, with a delayed compliance date of Oct. 5, 2004. Id.
50. Investment Company Act Rule 38a-1(a)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4), (e) (2006).
51. See id. § 270.17j-1(c)(1)(i) (2006); Investment Adviser Code of Ethics, Investment
Company Act Release No. 2256, 83 SEC Docket 828 (July 2, 2004). Among other things, a code
of ethics must set forth the standards of business conduct expected of supervisory personnel,
17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(a)(1) (2006), and must require “access persons” to report to the adviser
their personal securities transactions, including transactions in any mutual fund managed by the
adviser. Id. § 275.204A-1(b).
52. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed.
Reg. 46,380–81 (Aug. 2, 2004). As of July 2006, both the 75% independent directors condition
and the independent chairperson condition are in legal limbo. Both conditions were adopted by a
sharply divided Commission (3–2) and were promptly challenged in a lawsuit filed by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. On two separate occasions, the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs. In its first ruling, the D.C. Circuit remanded the rule to the SEC, concluding that the
SEC had violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by failing to determine the costs of
these two conditions and by failing to address a proposed alternative to the independent
chairperson condition. See Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412
F.3d 133, 137, 143–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The SEC responded by reconsidering the conditions
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requirements that independent directors hold quarterly “executive sessions”
separate from the board and that they have the authority to hire staff
(including independent counsel) to support their oversight responsibilities.53
The SEC also proposed rules to address the specific problems of market
timing and late trading. One proposed rule would have imposed a mandatory two percent redemption fee on fund shares sales made within five days
of a purchase.54 However, in response to comments from the industry, the
SEC ultimately adopted a modified rule that allows—but does not require—
funds to impose such fees.55 To thwart the illegal practice of late trading,
the SEC proposed a rule that would require all orders for purchases or sales
of fund shares to be received at the fund by a 4 p.m. EST “hard close.”56
Opposition to this proposed rule has been intense, however, and the SEC
appears to be considering alternatives.57
A final set of rules are aimed at enhancing the disclosures made by
mutual funds to the investing public. Pursuant to these requirements, mutual
funds must disclose their policies and procedures with respect to (1) market
timing, (2) “fair valuation” of their portfolio holdings, and (3) disclosure of
their portfolio holdings.58 The new rules also significantly expanded the
information required to be disclosed periodically to mutual fund

based on the original record, and readopting those conditions by the same sharply divided 3–2
vote (on virtually the eve of Chairman William Donaldson’s retirement from the Commission, no
less). The Chamber of Commerce quickly launched a second challenge, and on April 7, 2006, the
same panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated both conditions, concluding that the SEC’s speedy
“reconsideration” had violated the APA by failing to afford the opportunity for public comment
on certain data the Commissioners used in estimating the costs of complying with the two
conditions. See Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 443 F.3d 890,
899–908 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the SEC has sought additional
comments from the public on both the 75% independent directors condition and the independent
chairperson condition, and has asked specifically for comment on the costs of complying with
these conditions and whether these conditions “will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation” as required by Section 2(a) of the 1940 Act. See Investment Company Governance,
Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27395, 71 Fed. Reg.
35,366 (June 19, 2006).
53. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,384–85.
54. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,375, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762 (Mar. 11, 2004).
55. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed.
Reg. 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005).
56. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (Dec. 17, 2003).
57. See Mutual Funds: A Review of the Regulatory Landscape, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 109th Cong. 61 (2005) (statement of Meyer Eisenberg, Dir., SEC Div. Inv.
Mgt.).
58. See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings,
Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 Fed. Reg.
22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004).
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shareholders.59 In addition, mutual funds are now required to provide
enhanced disclosure regarding breakpoint discounts on front-end sales
loads.60
b. Enforcement Actions Against Mutual Funds
The SEC wasted no time stepping up its own enforcement efforts in
response to Eliot Spitzer’s widely publicized charges of fraud in the mutual
fund industry.61 As the Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division
reported to Congress, “immediately following [Spitzer’s] announcement,
relying on the Commission’s examination powers, the Commission’s staff
sent detailed information requests to 88 of the largest mutual fund
complexes in the country and 34 broker dealers . . . [seeking] information
on each entity’s policies and practices relating to market timing and late
trading.”62 Many of the responses “warranted aggressive follow-up”
inspections by SEC examiners and others “led to referrals to the enforcement staff for further investigation.”63 Additional investigations were
launched based on evidence uncovered through the efforts of both the
SEC’s enforcement staff and state attorneys general, particularly Spitzer.64
As of May 2005, the SEC had initiated 29 enforcement actions
involving fund complexes and their employees (including many of the
nation’s largest complexes) and 12 enforcement actions involving brokerdealers and their employees.65 Through settlements with these firms and
actions filed subsequently, the SEC has collected more than $3.3 billion
dollars in penalties and disgorgement.66 The SEC intends to distribute this
59. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8433, Exchange Act Release No. 49,909,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,485, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 30, 2004).
60. Disclosure of Breakpoint Discounts by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8427,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,817, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,464, 69 Fed. Reg.
33,262 (June 14, 2004).
61. For the first of many press releases from the N.Y. State Attorney General’s Office on the
mutual fund scandals, see Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. The press release announced a $40 million dollar settlement with
hedge-fund Canary Investment Management LLC for engaging in the practices of late trading and
market timing in several mutual fund complexes. Spitzer’s complaint against Canary named four
companies that had permitted such trading: Bank of America Corp., Bank One Corp., Strong
Capital Management, and Janus Capital Corp. Id.
62. Looking Out for Investors Hearing, supra note 9, at 184–85 (statement of Stephen Cutler,
Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
63. Id. at 185.
64. Id. at 180 (describing SEC enforcement efforts relating to mutual fund trading and stating
that “we are working aggressively . . . in close connection with State regulators, including Mr.
Spitzer and Mr. Galvin in Massachusetts”).
65. See Trading Abuses Hearings, supra note 1, at 38 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director,
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations).
66. See Annette L. Nazareth, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Commissioner, Remarks before the ABA
National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
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settlement money to mutual fund shareholders who had been harmed by the
trading abuses.67 In addition to substantial monetary payments and prophylactic relief in the form of cease-and-desist orders or injunctions, the SEC
settlements contained undertakings that required the firms to improve their
compliance practices and corporate governance structure.68
c. Mutual Fund Inspections and Examinations
Approximately 500 examiners are currently assigned by the OCIE to
inspect investment companies and investment advisers.69 Prior to the mutual
fund scandals, the SEC had fewer than 360 examiners.70 Even before the
scandals broke, a significant number of new hires had been planned from
the substantial appropriation increases to the SEC’s budget as part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.71 But the scandals reemphasized the priority
of enhancing the oversight of mutual funds.
The addition of these new examiners enabled the OCIE to increase the
frequency of its examinations: the nation’s largest funds are now scheduled
for examination at least once every two to three years.72 From 1998-2003,
the OCIE examined these firms once every five years, and prior to 1998 the
cycles for examination had been the remarkably long length of once every
12 to 24 years.73
speech/2006/spch092806aln.htm [hereinafter Nazareth Remarks]. By way of example, the SEC’s
case against Bank of America resulted in the payment of $250 million in disgorgement and a civil
penalty of $125 million. See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Reaches Agreement in
Principle to Settle Charges Against Bank of America for Market Timing and Late Trading: Bank
of America to Pay $375 Million, Exit Mutual Fund Clearing Business, and Make Other Remedial
Reforms (Mar. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-33.htm. Alliance
Capital Management agreed to pay $150 million in disgorgement and a civil penalty of $100
million. See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Alliance Capital Management Will Pay Record
$250 Million and Make Significant Governance and Compliance Reforms to Settle SEC Charges:
Entire Amount Will Be Returned To Investors Who Lost Money Because of Firm’s Illegal Timing
Arrangements (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-176.htm.
Putnam agreed to pay $5 million in disgorgement and $50 million in civil penalties. See Press
Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Putnam Agrees to Pay $55 Million to Resolve SEC Enforcement
Action Related to Market Timing by Portfolio Managers, S.E.C. 04-49, 2004 WL 762426 (Apr. 8,
2004). And for its role in facilitating late trading and market timing of mutual funds by its
customers and the customers of its introducing brokers, Bear Sterns recently consented to a
payment of $160 million in disgorgement and $90 million in civil penalties. See Press Release,
SEC Settles Fraud Charges with Bear Stearns for Late Trading and Market Timing Violations:
Firm to Pay $250 Million in Disgorgement and Penalties (Mar. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-38.htm.
67. See Nazareth Remarks, supra note 66.
68. See GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 25.
69. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director,
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations).
70. Id.
71. Id. (“[B]udget increases allowed the SEC to increase its staff for fund examinations by a
third . . . .”).
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id.
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The OCIE has also substantially revised its examination techniques to
improve the staff’s ability to more promptly identify emerging compliance
problems.74 Specifically, the OCIE has shifted to a “risk-based”
methodology for examining mutual funds and investment advisers which
“allows the staff to move more quickly, to be more nimble, and to be more
responsive to the rapidly changing risk environment in the fund community.”75 This new risk-based approach focuses routine examinations on
the nation’s largest funds and other firms posing the greatest compliance
risks (approximately 200 fund groups and 600 advisers).76 The remaining
firms are examined “for cause” in sweeps directed at specific risks or
possible violations across numerous firms, or at random.77
The OCIE’s new methodology is also credited with making greater use
of technology and data and increasing the number of interviews during
examinations in order to better assess a firm’s control or risk environment.78
Other enhancements include the establishment of “monitoring teams” for
the largest fund complexes, which allow examiners to become better
acquainted with the business and operations of a specific complex. In
addition, OCIE staff examiners work closely with the SEC’s new Office of
Risk Assessment “to help identify and coordinate areas of risk across the
agency.”79
B. PERIODIC CALLS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATION
From time to time over many decades, the SEC, Congress, and the
industry itself has considered the possibility of utilizing private sector
regulation for mutual funds and/or investment advisers. This section briefly
74. See id. at 41–46. See also GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 21 (“Over the
past 2 years, SEC staff has taken steps to better detect abusive practices in the mutual fund
industry and plans significant changes to its overall examination program.”).
75. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director,
SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations).
76. See GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 23.
77. Id. (“[Examiners will] conduct random inspections of some portion of the remaining
firms.”).
78. See Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 42 (prepared statement of Lori A. Richards,
Director, SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). See also GAO Lessons
Learned Report, supra note 44, at 22 (reporting the OCIE Director’s statement that “interviews
had begun to play an increased role in assessing companies’ critical risks and control
environments”).
79. Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Lori A. Richards, Director, SEC
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations). As described in the GAO report, the duties
of the Office of Risk Assessment include:
(1) gathering and maintaining data on new trends and risks from external experts,
domestic and foreign agencies, surveys, focus groups, and other market data; (2)
analyzing data to identify and assess new areas of concern across professions,
companies, industries, and markets; and (3) preparing assessments and forecasts on the
agency’s risk environment.
GAO Lessons Learned Report, supra note 44, at 24.
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examines several proposals relating specifically to the mutual fund industry
and explores some of the reasons why these proposals have not resulted in
private regulation.
1. Proposals from the SEC
While informal discussions between SEC officials and industry
participants about private regulation for mutual funds are legion,80 only
twice—in 198381 and 200382—has the SEC sought public comment on a
specific proposal for a mutual fund SRO.83 On both occasions the industry
80. As far back as the early 1960s, the SEC had begun urging the Investment Company
Institute to establish itself a self-regulatory organization for mutual funds. See William L. Cary,
Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 247 (1963) (“[The SEC and the ICI
both] agreed on the principle that more inspection of investment companies is called for,” but the
“industry believed [that the SEC] should perform the inspection,” whereas the SEC “suggested
that the Institute take the initiative.”). These informal discussions between the SEC and the ICI
intensified again in the early 1980s. See Will ICI Lend SEC a Hand in Watching Over Industry,
FUND ACTION, Feb. 7, 2005, at 1 (“When David Ruder was SEC Chairman . . . we came very
close to making ICI the SRO for funds.” (quoting former ICI President David Silver)). According
to Silver, it floundered on only one point: the “ICI wanted an assurance the SEC would not give
that if the Institute took an enforcement action against a fund company the SEC, NASD or the
states would not jump in with actions of their own.” Id.
81. See Utilizing Private Entities, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044, 68 Fed. Reg.
7038 (Feb. 23, 1983).
82. See Compliance Programs, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,925, [2002–2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,827, at 87,177 (Feb. 5, 2003).
83. On several occasions during the 20 year period between these proposals, SEC officials
raised in congressional testimony the possibility of an SRO for funds and/or advisers. See
Hearings on the Unfair Practice that Exists with Some Financial Planners and the Need for
Congress to Support the SEC Through Additional Funding and Staffing for Regulation of the
Financial Planning Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 26 (1992) (testimony of Richard C. Breedan,
SEC Chairman):
Another proposal that has been made in the past would be to create an SRO in this area.
That’s certainly a possibility. When the Commission proposed that a couple of years
ago, there was a great deal of objection received from a number of groups in the public,
and frankly, we believe it would be much more expensive than conducting
examinations through the SEC.
Id. Proposed Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 127
(1992) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, SEC Chairman) (“I would agree that, in concept, [an
SRO] is something worth looking at . . . . In fact it might be considerably more costly than an SEC
examination. . . . We would be happy to work with the SRO’s in areas where it made sense, and
from an overall point of view of economy.”). See also Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 12 (1993) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund
Industry] (testimony of Arthur J. Levitt, SEC Chairman):
I think, in general, an SRO has proven to be one of the most effective ways of
monitoring a growing complex of financial services in our society, and it’s a way that I
am seriously considering with respect to investment companies and even considering
more seriously with respect to investment advisers.
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reaction was exceedingly negative.84 Indeed, unlike the broker-dealer
industry which historically has embraced self-regulation, the mutual fund
industry has been quite content with direct regulation and examination by
the SEC.85
The SEC’s 2003 proposal was significantly broader than the
“inspection-only” proposal floated twenty years earlier. Couched in the
Release as one of four potential approaches to increasing private sector
involvement in the SEC’s regulatory program, the 2003 proposal noted that
an SRO for mutual funds:
would function in a manner analogous to the national securities exchanges
and registered securities associations under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by (i) establishing business practice rules and ethical standards, (ii)
conducting routine examinations, (iii) requiring minimum education or
experience standards, and (iv) bringing its own actions to discipline
members for violating its rules and the federal securities laws.86

As with the NASD and the NYSE, any SRO for mutual funds “would
be subject to the pervasive oversight of the Commission” and the SEC
“would examine its activities, require it to keep records, and approve its
rules. . . .”87 But the Release further stated that the “staff would continue to
examine the activities of funds and advisers, both to ensure adequate
examination coverage and to provide oversight of the SRO examination
program.”88

Id.

84. See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
85. The same is true for the investment adviser and financial planning industries. Despite
several SEC and congressional proposals to establish one or more SROs for investment advisers,
none have been adopted. See, e.g., Investment Adviser Self-Regulation Act of 1989, 135 CONG.
REC. E. 2736 (1989); see also Investment Adviser Reform: Hearing on H.R. 578 Before the
Subcomm. On Telecomms. And Fin. Of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 8
(1993). The possibility of creating one or more SROs for investment advisers also was raised as a
recommendation in the SEC’s 1963 study of the securities markets. See REPORT OF SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc.
No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 158–59 (1963).
As others have noted, the problem of effectively regulating investment advisers was
resolved, at least in part, when Congress enacted the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996. See FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[A][8] (citing National Securities
Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 Stat. 3416 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of the United States Code)). Among other reforms, the Act divided
jurisdiction over the regulation of investment advisers between the federal government and the
states: advisers with more than $25 million of assets under management must register with the
SEC and adhere to federal law whereas advisers managing assets beneath this threshold are
regulated by the states pursuant to state law. See Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds,
Investment Advisers, and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419,
443 (1997).
86. Compliance Programs, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 87,183.
87. Id. at 87,184.
88. Id.
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The impetus for the 2003 proposal was the SEC’s lack of adequate
resources, notwithstanding the anticipated substantial increase to the SEC’s
budget.89 In fact, the Release went so far as to predict that “even if we are
able to substantially expand our examination staff, it is unlikely that future
growth in our resources will ever keep pace with future growth of
investment advisers and investment companies.”90 It bears noting that the
2003 proposal was released for comment in February 2003, more than six
months before the revelation of the market timing and late trading scandals
that prompted congressional hearings and demands for change.
Industry participants and representatives of the investing public, with
very few exceptions, were vehemently opposed to the 2003 proposal. Most
commentators questioned the need for change, highlighting the SEC’s
success with direct regulation and examination of funds91 and pointing to
the mutual fund industry’s proud “record of compliance with both the letter
and the spirit of the securities laws.”92 Commentators were also concerned
that the establishment of an SRO for mutual funds would create
“inconsistent and fragmented layers of regulation”93 and that “forming and
operating an SRO would be extremely costly” with such costs ultimately to
be borne by investors.94 Others bemoaned that self-regulation “would
require funds to pay twice, once to the Commission and once to an SRO,
for essentially the same amount of oversight they receive today.”95
The 1983 proposal was developed in a manner similar to the 2003
proposal and met with a similar fate. After more than twenty years of back
and forth discussions between SEC officials and industry participants,96 in
February 1983 the SEC issued a release seeking public comment on the
concept of utilizing the private sector to perform routine inspections of
89. See id. at 87,182.
90. Id.
91. See Letter from Craig S. Tyle, Gen. Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70303/s70303-15.pdf (“It bears emphasizing that the current system of Commission oversight of
mutual funds has worked exceptionally well for more than sixty years.”).
92. Id.
93. Letter from David Riggs, Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Charles Schwab & Co.,
Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC, Proposed Rule: Compliance Programs of Investment
Companies and Investment Advisers 5 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s70303/charlesschwab042303.htm.
94. Hester Peirce, Div. Inv. Mgmt., Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and
Investment Advisors: Summary of Contents on Proposed New Rules 38a-1 Under the Investment
Company Act and 206(4)-7 Under the Investment Advisors Act, and Proposed Amendments to
Rule 204-2 Under the Investment Advisers Act (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s70303summary.pdf.
95. Letter from Heidi Stam, Principal, Sec. Regulation, Vanguard Group, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Sec’y, SEC 6 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70303/vanguard
041603.htm (“Requiring Commission staff to continue to examine funds and advisers, with the
additional burden of overseeing an SRO, ultimately would weaken rather than strengthen the
Commission’s ability to effectively oversee funds and advisers.”).
96. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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mutual funds and other investment companies.97 After highlighting the
industry’s “dramatic growth” and lamenting the “budgetary constraints that
prevent the allocation of greater staff resources to the investment company
examination program,”98 the release sought guidance on a number of alternatives, including the possibility of creating one or more SROs to conduct
routine periodic inspections of investment companies.99 Under this alternative, the SRO would have the “limited function of conducting examinations of investment companies which elect to participate in such an
examination program, and making the results of those examinations available to the Commission.”100 But even with this limited function, an SRO for
the purpose of inspecting mutual funds lacked the necessary support from
the industry.
The comments from the mutual fund industry in response to the SEC’s
proposals, particularly the 2003 proposal, reflect the industry’s concerns
with the costs of private regulation and the fragmentation that could result
from concurrent private and public regulation. Some observers might argue
that the industry is well aware that the SEC’s budget has not kept pace with
the explosive growth of mutual funds and that the industry prefers to be
regulated by an entity that is strapped for resources. But cutting against this
explanation for its reticence to private regulation is the industry’s traditional
support in Congress for increased SEC appropriations for mutual fund
oversight.101
Another explanation for the reticence may be that the mutual fund
industry places a high value on its ability to advertise itself as “regulated by
the SEC.”102 As Professor Tamar Frankel has observed:
Regulation offers issuers and institutions government support in their
efforts to gain investors’ trust in the financial markets. Just as it is difficult
to validate the trustworthiness of these institutions, it is also very costly
for the institutions to convince investors of their trustworthiness.
Regulation reduces the institutions’ costs. Regulation also helps to restrain
the “bad apples” that may ruin confidence in the industry; a few
97. Concept of Utilizing Private Entities in Investment Company Examinations and Imposing
Examination Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,044, 48 Fed. Reg. 8485 (Feb. 23,
1983).
98. Id. at 8486.
99. Id. at 8486–87.
100. Id. at 8487.
101. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund Industry, supra note 83, at 95 (statement
of Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company Institute) (“[The ICI] has for years supported
increased funding for the SEC (and for the Division of Investment Management in particular), so
that the highly effective regulation that the mutual fund industry has experienced to date will be
assured in the future.”).
102. Cf. Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 439, 442 (2002). Small investment advisers “vehemently opposed” legislation curtailing
federal regulation because “[t]hey wanted to continue to advertise themselves as ‘Regulated by the
SEC,’ which they valued more than the advertising of ‘Regulated by State X.’” Id.
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untrustworthy members may spoil the reputation for trustworthiness for all
industry members. Regulation provides the industry with the stamp of
“good housekeeping.” It implies that the government guards investors’
interests, and reduces the very high costs that investors would otherwise
bear in monitoring the issuers and the institutions.103

Earning a “good housekeeping” stamp from the SEC may well be
significantly more valuable to the mutual fund industry than a “good
housekeeping stamp” from an SRO.
2. Congressional Proposals
After decades of listening to the SEC’s repeated warnings of inadequate
resources in the area of mutual fund regulation,104 in the wake of the market
timing and late trading mutual fund scandals, Congress was jolted into
action. The result was a series of oversight hearings and a flurry of bills,
with some bills proposing new regulations as well as the creation of a
“Mutual Fund Oversight Board” modeled on the recently created PCAOB.
Due in part to the upcoming 2004 presidential election, a bill jointly
sponsored by Senators John Kerry, Edward Kennedy, and Thomas
Daschle—The Mutual Fund Protection Act of 2003—drew substantial
attention from the media and financial press. The bill called for the
congressional creation of a not-for-profit corporation—the Mutual Fund
Oversight Board—which “shall not be an agency or establishment of the
United States Government.”105 As envisioned, it would have possessed
registration, investigation, disciplinary, and rulemaking authority over
mutual fund directors.106 The Board’s members would have been selected
by the SEC,107 and it would have been funded by assessments against
mutual fund assets or management fees.108 Providing the rationale for its
creation, Senator Kerry maintained:
The actions by the SEC show that it is incapable of protecting investors
from securities fraud by mutual fund companies and will not prosecute
this type of fraud to the full extent of the law. Therefore, we must take the
day-to-day oversight of mutual funds away from the SEC and develop a
new Mutual Fund Oversight Board to provide oversight, examination and
enforcement of mutual funds. This new board will be similar to the Public
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund Industry, supra note 83, at 7–12
(statement of Arthur J. Levitt, SEC Chairman); Mutual Fund Industry Hearing, supra note 3, at
134–37.
105. Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201(b), 149 CONG.
REC. 15,977, 15,984 (2003). Much of the text of the provisions creating the Board was drawn
verbatim from Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the PCAOB. See infra notes 113–
121 and accompanying text.
106. Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act §§ 202−205 (2003).
107. Id. § 201(e)(3).
108. Id. § 207(d)(1)–(2).
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Company Accounting Oversight Board developed in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.109

The Kerry-Kennedy-Daschle bill, along with a number of other bills on
the subject of mutual fund reform, failed to proceed very far in Congress.110
To be sure, the demand for reform was high.111 But as recounted above, the
SEC managed to put forth a convincing case that it was focused on the
problems in the mutual fund industry and was proceeding down a path of
substantial change.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATION FOR
THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
Private regulation for the securities industry pre-dates the creation of
the SEC by almost 150 years.112 Until very recently, this private regulation
took the form of self-regulation under SEC oversight, whereby brokerdealers trading on exchanges, and later in the over-the counter market,
agreed to comply with detailed rules and principles of fair dealing
promulgated by the industry. With the creation of the PCAOB, however,
another type of private regulation was born: so-called “independent” private
regulation. This part explores both types of regulation and concludes that
neither constitutes an appropriate model for the mutual fund industry.
A. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE REGULATION: THE PCAOB MODEL
1. The Structure and Responsibilities of the PCAOB
Congress created the PCAOB in July 2002 as the centerpiece of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.113 The PCAOB’s principal mission was to restore
investor confidence by preventing the types of accounting scandals that
resulted in the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other
companies in 2001 and 2002.114

109. 149 CONG. REC. S15,984 (Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2003_record&page=S15881&
position=all.
110. See supra note 15; see also Tracking of the Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act of 2003,
S. 1958, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1081958 (noting that the bill was introduced in Congress on November 25, 2003, and the last action
on the bill was December 9, 2003).
111. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
112. See infra text accompanying note 148.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. II 2002); see also PCAOB, 2003 Annual Report at 5,
http://www.pcaobus.org/about_the_pcaob/annual_reports/2003.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB 2003
Annual Report].

30

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

As part of this congressionally-designed crackdown, Title I of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act115 charged the ostensibly private PCAOB116 with the
broad responsibility of overseeing the audits of public companies (rendering
the PCAOB as the auditor’s auditor). Specifically, the legislation provided
that the PCAOB shall: register accounting firms that audit public
companies;117 enact rules setting standards for auditing, quality control,
ethics, and independence;118 inspect on a yearly basis the nation’s largest
accounting firms and inspect other firms at least once every three years;119
investigate possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal securities
laws by accounting firms and their associated persons;120 and impose
discipline for established violations through a range of sanctions including
censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and substantial monetary
fines.121
Congress also charged the SEC with ultimate oversight of the PCAOB
(rendering the SEC, in a manner of speaking, the auditor of the auditor’s
auditor). Specifically, the SEC appoints the PCAOB’s Chairperson and its
four other members (who can only be removed for cause);122 approves the
PCAOB’s budget;123 approves any rules adopted by the PCAOB;124 and
retains review power over any disciplinary actions taken by the PCAOB.125
The PCAOB was deemed fully operational by the SEC on April 25,
2003.126 Since that time, the PCAOB has grown into an organization with
approximately 450 employees in Washington, D.C. and seven regional
offices, and an operating budget of $130.5 million for fiscal year 2006.127
Congress provided that its primary source of funding—often referred to as
“private sector funding”—was to come from the “accounting support fees”
that the PCAOB was authorized to levy on public companies in accordance
with a formula based on market capitalization.128

115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219 (Supp. II 2002).
116. Title I provides that “[t]he Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government,” and that “[n]o member or person employed by, or agent for, the Board shall
be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such
service.” Id. § 7211(b).
117. Id. § 7211(a).
118. Id. § 7211(c)(2).
119. Id. § 7214(b)(1)(A)–(B).
120. Id. § 7211(c)(4).
121. Id. § 7215(c)(4)(A)–(D).
122. Id. § 7211(e)(4), (6)
123. Id. § 7219(b).
124. Id. § 7217(b)(2).
125. Id. § 7217(c)(2).
126. PCAOB, 2003 Annual Report, supra note 114, at 5.
127. PCAOB: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2006 Budget 5,
http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_PCAOB/Budget_Presentations/2006.pdf.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(c)(1), (g).
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2. Should an Independent Oversight Board be Established for
Mutual Funds?
I have argued previously that the decision to create the PCAOB as a
private entity was profoundly unwise, both for doctrinal reasons as well as
normative ones.129 To be sure, the accounting profession was sorely in need
of restructured regulation and Congress was right to take up that task. But
Congress’s resort to the legal fiction that the PCAOB is a private
corporation jeopardizes the PCAOB’s ability to fulfill its role as the
accounting industry’s principal regulator.
Prior Supreme Court precedent makes very clear that, for purposes of
the U.S. Constitution, the PCAOB is part of the federal government
notwithstanding its congressional designation as a private corporation. The
decision most directly on point is Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,130 where the Court set forth a three prong test for determining
whether an ostensibly private entity is actually part of the “Government
itself.”131 Under Lebron, when (1) “the Government creates a corporation
by special law,” (2) “for the furtherance of governmental objectives,” and
(3) “retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the
directors of that corporation,” that “corporation is part of the Government,”
at least for purposes of constitutional law.132 Thus, federal courts—
including one at this very moment in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia133—must now grapple with whether the PCAOB’s structure
comports with the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of
powers. And even if these threshold issues are resolved in the PCAOB’s
favor, other challenges against the constitutionality of the PCAOB’s actions
will invariably follow.134
Congress’s decision to create the PCAOB as a private corporation is
also troubling from a policy perspective. As a private entity, even one that
is subject to SEC oversight, the PCAOB is less publicly accountable, its
operations are less transparent, and its policymaking is less legitimate than
its federal regulatory counterparts.135 Moreover, the PCAOB’s status as a
private corporation raises, rather than lowers, the overall costs of its
regulatory program. Had the PCAOB been established as a federal entity, it

129. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1048–57, 1061–69.
130. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). In Lebron, an 8–1 majority of the Supreme Court held that Amtrak
was part of the federal government, notwithstanding Congress’ statutory declaration that it is a
private corporation and “not . . . an agency or establishment of the United States Government.” Id.
at 391.
131. Id. at 397.
132. Id. at 400.
133. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 1:06-cv-00217-JR,
2006 WL 645100 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2006).
134. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1044.
135. See id. at 1062–66.
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could be operating more cost effectively, in part because the compensation
to its members and staff likely would have been less.136
My opinion about the appropriateness of the PCAOB model for the
mutual fund industry should therefore come as no surprise: Congress should
not compound its mistake in creating the PCAOB as a private corporation
by establishing a new centaur-like entity for the mutual fund industry. Such
an entity would surely fall prey to the same constitutional challenges and
policy indictments currently being launched at the PCAOB.
3. The Road Not Taken—Independent Government Regulation
At the congressional hearings that preceded the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U.S. Comptroller General David Walker testified that
while there were “several alternative structures” from which Congress
could choose in establishing a new regulator for the accounting industry,
the one that he favored would have created “an independent government
entity within the SEC.”137 His second favored alternative, possibly modeled
on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal
Reserve, would have created “an independent government agency outside
the SEC.”138 He did not favor the creation of “a non-governmental privatesector entity overseen by the SEC” because such a “body would have less
direct accountability to the Congress and the public than a body with board
members who are PASs [president appointed confirmed by the Senate].”139

136. Of course, some would argue that the regulator for the accounting industry “needed” to be
private because the regulator “needed” to pay private-sector salaries to attract highly qualified
board members and staff. See, e.g., The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities & Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583 (2004).
We were created as a not-for-profit corporation largely so the PCAOB could pay better
than government. . . . [Members of Congress] realized that they were piling an immense
responsibility on a startup, and so one of the things they figured out is you’re going to
have to pay people better than the government can pay . . . .
Id. (quoting William McDonough, PCAOB Chairman); see also Nagy, supra note 9, at 1069 n.501
(citing additional sources). But a sufficient number of talented accountants and lawyers may well
have been eager to sign on with a new public sector regulator for the accounting industry, and a
pay scale on par with the SEC or federal banking regulators may not have dissuaded them.
Furthermore, even if there were a legitimate need for the accounting regulator to pay wages above
those paid by the SEC and the federal bank regulators, no structural impediment would have
prevented Congress from authorizing the disparity. The only barriers were political, not legal. See
id. at 1068–69.
137. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON
AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM,
REP. NO. GAO-02-411, at 79 (May 2002) (Letter from David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen.,
to Hon. Paul Sarbanes, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
Senate 5 (May 3, 2002)), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02411.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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He also expressed concern that a private sector entity “would increase the
SEC’s responsibility as well as its workload.”140
Short of a Supreme Court decision invalidating the PCAOB’s current
structure as unconstitutional, however, there is little reason to expect
Congress to revisit this issue and recreate the PCAOB as an independent
government regulator. That reality is unfortunate because the road not taken
would have led to a stronger PCAOB that was more aligned with
democratic values.
The possibility of independent government regulation remains open for
the mutual fund industry. Yet a path down that road would make little
sense. In the case of accounting, the creation of an entirely new entity was
warranted because the SEC did not have a long and established tradition of
inspecting and regulating the practice of auditing, and the need to replace
the prior system of self-regulation was clear.141 Mutual funds, in contrast,
have been inspected and regulated by the SEC for the last 65 years, with
notable success and only infrequent criticism.142 In light of that experience,
it is difficult to see how a new federal regulator could oversee the mutual
fund industry any more efficiently or effectively with the same expenditure
of resources.
Moreover, to the extent that the SEC’s shortcomings in regulating
mutual funds can be attributed to agency capture, the potential for capture
would only be increased in a newly created federal agency designed to
focus exclusively on the regulation of the mutual fund industry. Indeed, as
others have noted, “a well-known empirical regularity is that single industry
regulators are typically more prone to capture than [multi]–industry
regulators.”143
B. SELF-REGULATION: THE NASD AND NYSE MODEL
1. Self-Regulation as Distinguished from the PCAOB
The recent litigation challenging the constitutionality of the PCAOB
has focused renewed attention on the structural similarities between the
PCAOB and the NASD and NYSE, and has prompted some to question
whether a determination that the PCAOB is part of the federal government
would jeopardize the legal status of these SROs.144 To be sure, as the SEC

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
See Nagy, supra note 9, at 984.
See Birdthistle, supra note 6, at 1408.
Trading Abuses Hearing, supra note 1, at 61 (testimony of Eric W. Zitzewitz, Stanford
Graduate School of Business). For an extensive overview of capture theory and the debates
surrounding it, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–73 (1992).
144. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the PCAOB Unconstitutional?, 235 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2006).
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tacitly acknowledged in The Matter of Frank Quattrone,145 the NASD and
the NYSE’s close entwinement with the SEC raises legitimate questions as
to whether some SRO actions should be deemed “state action” for purposes
of the Constitution.146 But under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lebron,
neither the NASD nor the NYSE should be deemed the “government itself.”
Taking the three prongs of the test in Lebron,147 we can see why this is so.
Focusing on the first prong, neither the NASD nor the NYSE were
“created” by Congress. Although Congress created a scheme of statutory
self-regulation pursuant to which both entities are afforded certain quasigovernment powers, both the NASD and the NYSE were formed by
members of the industry they regulate—the “self” in self-regulation. The
NYSE was established in 1792 when a group of securities brokers signed
the “Buttonwood Agreement.”148 The NASD can trace its roots back to
1912 when a group of investment bankers formed the Investment Bankers
Association of America (IBA).149 In contrast, the PCAOB owes its entire

145. In the Matter of Frank P. Quattrone, Exchange Act Release No. 53,547 (Mar. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-53547.pdf (setting aside NASD summary
disposition imposing a lifetime ban because Quattrone’s introduction of “specific facts to support
his contention that NASD engaged in state action as a joint actor with the Commission” earned
him the right to an evidentiary hearing under NASD rules).
146. See infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 132 and accompanying text.
148. See About the NYSE: History, Firsts & Records, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/
1022221392987.html.
149. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING AND OF THE FIRST ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE INVESTMENT BANKERS’ ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 12 (August 8, 1912)
(Address of Chairman George Caldwell). See also Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the
Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23–24 (Jan. 2001) (discussing the predecessor
organizations to the NASD); VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 165 (Ralph W. Hidy ed., 1970) (“[The IBA] was the industry’s united response to
mounting public criticism and increasing demands for regulatory legislation.”). In 1933, the IBA
availed itself of the self-regulatory framework provided in the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), and formed the Investment Bankers Code Committee
(IBCC), charging it with the establishment of a code of fair competition. President Roosevelt
approved that code in November 1933, but it fell victim to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935), which declared the NIRA
unconstitutional. Most investment bankers “continued to adhere to the code voluntarily,” and in
1936, the IBCC (which reorganized itself informally as the Investment Bankers Conference
Committee (the “Conference Committee”)) began working with the SEC “to establish a new,
permanent nationwide organization under the SEC.” CAROSSO, supra, at 389. According to
Carosso, the Conference Committee’s “most important contribution was to draft the legislation
subsequently passed as the Maloney Act.” Id. at 390. The Maloney Act added Section 15A to the
Exchange Act, specifying the criteria pursuant to which the SEC may register “national securities
associations” with rulemaking, investigative, and enforcement authority over their members. After
the Maloney Act’s passage in 1938, the Conference Committee again reorganized to form the
NASD, and in August 1939, the SEC formally registered the NASD as the nation’s first, and until
the recent registration of the National Futures Association, only national securities association.
See, e.g., Robert Glauber, Chairman and CEO, NASD, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. H.R. Hearing
on Self-Regulatory Organizations: Exploring the Need for Reform 1 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at
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existence and structure to Congress.150 That is, as previously noted,
Congress designed the PCAOB and specified that it was to have five
members; Congress imposed for PCAOB members a limit of two terms;
Congress protected PCAOB members from removal except by the SEC
(and then only for good cause); and Congress assigned the PCAOB its very
specific oversight responsibilities. Moreover, to separate the PCAOB
further from its self-regulatory cousins, Congress specifically provided that
no more than two CPAs can serve as members at any one time.151
Skipping to the third prong of the Lebron test, it is also clear that
neither the NASD nor the NYSE are controlled by a board that is appointed
by the government. Both entities select their own boards and the
government plays no role in the appointment of NASD or NYSE
directors.152 In stark contrast, the SEC appoints the PCAOB’s board (after
consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of
the Treasury) and only the SEC can remove PCAOB members—and then
only for cause.
Some courts applying the Lebron test also look to government funding
of an ostensibly private entity as an additional indicia of governmental

http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/111705rg.pdf [hereinafter Testimony of Robert
Glauber, NASD Chairman and CEO].
150. It is instructive to compare the PCAOB to the system of accounting regulation proposed in
an alternative bill that was drafted by Congressman Michael Oxley. See Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3763: [hereinafter CAARTA].
Passing overwhelmingly in the House by a vote of 334 to 90, see Final Vote Results For Roll
Call 110, Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act, H.R. 3763 (Apr. 24,
2002) (recorded vote), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll110.xml, but later abandoned in favor
of a Senate bill proposed by Senator Paul Sarbanes, the Oxley bill would have permitted the SEC
to recognize “public regulatory organization[s]” for the accounting industry in a way similar to
which the SEC was authorized to recognize the NASD as a “national securities association.” See
CAARTA, supra, § 2(b). Had the PCAOB been developed in this cooperative manner by the SEC
and the accounting industry, that entity properly could have been described as a self-regulatory
organization. But the PCAOB was a congressionally-created independent regulation—it is not a
self-regulator. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(2) (Supp. II 2002).
152. In December 2004, the SEC released for public comment proposed rules that would have
required registered “national securities exchanges” and registered “national securities
associations” to have a governing board “composed of a majority of independent directors, with
key board committees to be composed solely of independent directors.” Fair Administration and
Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,126 at 71,133 (Dec. 8, 2004). The proposed rules would also require these SROs to separate,
either structurally or functionally, their regulatory operations from their market operations and
other commercial interests. Id. at 71,141–43. Although the SEC has not adopted these proposals as
rules, both the NASD and the NYSE have adopted structural changes that would bring the SROs
more in line with these proposals. See, e.g., NYSE Supports Targeted Improvements to
Self Regulation (April 2005), http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/1113302997067.html;
Testimony of Robert Glauber, NASD Chairman and CEO, supra note 149, at 2–3.
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control.153 But here again we see a significant difference between the
NASD/NYSE and the PCAOB: both the NASD and the NYSE receive their
funding from the members they regulate, whereas the PCAOB’s funding
stems from a congressional mandate effectively requiring public companies
to pay “accounting support fees.”154 Thus, even if the “government control”
prong of the Lebron test is viewed more flexibly,155 it is highly unlikely that
a court would deem either the NYSE or the NASD as an entity “controlled”
by the government.
Returning to the second prong under Lebron, there is certainly no
denying that Congress vested the NASD and the NYSE with governmentlike rulemaking, investigative and disciplinary powers and that these SROs,
in the words of Lebron, further important “governmental objectives.”156 But
while a necessary condition, that is hardly sufficient to deem an entity the
government itself. Indeed, if furthering important “governmental
objectives” were the sine qua non of a public entity, than a host of services
frequently “contracted out” by the government—including education,
medical care, transportation, and insurance—would be forever removed
from the private sector.
The government-like rulemaking, investigative and disciplinary powers
of the NASD and NYSE do, however, make these entities susceptible to
constitutional challenges on the ground that their actions constitute “state
action” under Supreme Court precedents.157 Such challenges have in the
past been met with mixed success.158
153. See, e.g., Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Cooperative Extension of Schenectady County, 252
F.3d 545, 552–53 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding in dicta that the state-created and state funded
agricultural cooperative was a state actor even though only two of its ten board members were
appointed by the government).
154. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7219(c)(1), (g) (Supp. II 2002).
155. See, e.g., Sotack v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (finding that because the Commissioner of Pennsylvania’s Department of Insurance “has
virtually limitless authority to supervise and regulate [the] PPCIGA at all times,” the PPCIGA
satisfies the “control” prong in Lebron, even though “the members of the Board are typically not
appointed by the government”).
156. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
157. Traditional state action analysis requires a court to determine whether “there is a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (holding that private insurer who withheld payment was not a
state actor despite being subject to extensive government regulations). More recently, the Court
has focused on the private entity’s overall “entwinement” with the government. See Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001) (“Entwinement to the
degree shown here” supports the conclusion that the TSSAA “ought to be charged with a public
character and judged by constitutional standards.”). The scholarly literature on the so-called state
action doctrine is voluminous. For insightful overviews, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Back to the Briarpatch: An
Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 302 (1995); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367
(2003).
158. Compare Villani v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(“It is now beyond dispute that the Fifth Amendment due process requirements as to federal action
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2. Should an SRO be Established for Mutual Funds?
Having drawn the distinction between the PCAOB (an ostensibly
private independent regulatory body) and the NASD and NYSE (private
self-regulatory bodies), we can now explore the question of whether an
SRO modeled on the NASD or NYSE should be established for the mutual
fund industry. Although self-regulation under SEC oversight has worked
reasonably well for the broker-dealer industry,159 such a self-regulatory
system should not be established for mutual funds.160
Many of the arguments against the creation of an SRO for mutual funds
relate to the well-recognized weaknesses inherent to any system of selfregulation. As a congressional committee observed more than 30 years ago:
The inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself are well
known: the natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the
group to be regulated, the temptation to use a facade of industry regulation
as a shield to ward off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for
businessmen to use collective action to advance their interests through the
imposition of purely anticompetitive restraints as opposed to those
justified by regulatory needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory
pattern because of vested economic interests in its preservation.161

With respect to broker-dealers, both Congress and the SEC have
determined that these disadvantages are outweighed by the benefits of selfregulation. Among other benefits:

apply to the disciplinary hearings conducted by the Exchange.”), aff’d sub nom. Sloan v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., Inc., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973), and Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch.,
452 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The intimate involvement of the Exchange with the
[Commission] brings it within the purview of the Fifth Amendment controls over governmental
due process.”), with United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867–68 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that
NYSE’s status as a private institution insulates it from defendant’s claim that he was denied the
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination), and Jones v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 115
F.3d 1173, 1183 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s constitutional challenge under the Double
Jeopardy Clause in part because “[w]hile the NASD is a closely regulated corporation, it is not a
governmental agency, but rather a private corporation organized under the laws of Delaware”).
For articles analyzing whether constitutional protections should apply to SRO disciplinary actions,
see William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction Among
Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 727
(2004); Richard L. Stone & Michael Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory
Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453
(1995).
159. But as the SEC itself recognized in its 2004 Concept Release on self-regulation, “recent
failings or perceived failings with respect to SROs fulfilling their self-regulatory obligations have
sparked public debate as to the efficacy of the SRO system in general.” Concept Release
Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,257
(Dec. 8, 2004).
160. For additional scholarly commentary on this question, see Seligman, supra note 8, at
1120–26 and Frankel, supra note 8, at 448–50.
161. Staff of S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., Report of the
Subcomm. on Securities (Comm. Print 1973), quoted in Seligman, supra note 8, at 1120.
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The expertness and immediacy of self-regulation often provide the most
expedient and practical means for regulation. By making those regulated
actual participants in the regulatory process they become more aware of
the goals of regulation and their own stake in it. In some areas the selfregulatory bodies can promote adherence to ethical standards beyond
those which could be established as a matter of law.162

But for a variety of reasons, the calculus performed for the brokerdealer industry would not yield the same result for the mutual fund industry.
Indeed, for mutual funds, the benefits of self-regulation would be far less
meaningful and the disadvantages would be substantially greater.
As Part I of this article has demonstrated, mutual funds already operate
under a highly specific and demanding system of statutory regulation that
has been in existence for more than 65 years. That was not the case for
broker-dealers when Congress opted to delegate substantial rulemaking,
investigative, and disciplinary authority to the stock exchanges in 1934 and
to the NASD in 1939.163 Thus, SROs operating under SEC oversight spared
the SEC and Congress much heavy lifting in the area of broker-dealer
regulation. In the case of mutual funds, however, the heavy lifting has
already been done by the government. It is impossible to turn back the
clock to recapture that significant self-regulatory advantage.
An SRO for mutual funds also cannot be justified as a cost-savings
measure. As the mutual fund industry has been quick to point out, the
creation of an SRO would be tremendously expensive and the SRO’s
funding would in all likelihood have to come—directly or indirectly—from
mutual fund shareholders.164 Such membership fees to the SRO would be
on top of the substantial registration and filing fees already paid to the SEC
by funds and advisers.165 The SEC, in turn, would face the added cost of
overseeing this new SRO. And given the SEC’s statement in its 2003
proposal that its “staff would continue to examine the activities of funds
and advisers,”166 there would be little reason to expect a significant
offsetting reduction in the SEC’s present costs of mutual fund regulation.
Moreover, the self-regulatory promise of higher standards of ethical
behavior holds less value in the mutual fund industry, where the securities
law itself demands a very high standard of conduct. Unlike broker-dealers
who generally deal in arms-length transactions with their customers and

162. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 722 (1963).
163. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
165. But cf. Seligman, supra note 8, at 1126 (expounding the benefits of an SRO for mutual
funds, but acknowledging that whether they are worth the costs is an empirical question meriting
serious study).
166. See Compliance Programs, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,925, [2002–2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,827, at 87,184 (Feb. 5, 2003).
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other broker-dealers,167 investment companies and their investment advisers
owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders who entrust their money to mutual
funds.168 The critical question then is who is better positioned to ensure that
the mutual fund industry adheres to those very high standards—the SEC or
the industry itself?
There should be little doubt that, as the federal agency charged with the
responsibility of protecting investors, the SEC would be far more effective
than the industry in ensuring that mutual funds and their advisers adhere to
the very high standards of conduct proscribed by the law. A mutual fund
SRO would suffer from the same inherent conflicts of interest that occur
whenever an industry has principal responsibility for overseeing the policies
and practices of its members. But the creation of a mutual fund SRO laden
with these conflicts is particularly troubling because mutual funds already
operate under a built-in conflict resulting from their management by
affiliated investment advisers.169 Although SEC officials (not to mention
members of Congress) may be susceptible to pressure from the mutual fund
industry to lessen the burdens of regulation and enforcement, that pressure
does not even come close to the daily conflicts that would be faced by
regulators selected by and responsible to the firms that are members of the
SRO.
The SEC would also be less likely to promulgate rules aimed
specifically to discourage competition. In contrast, a mutual fund SRO may
frequently be tempted to use its control over membership to thwart competition. Although the tendency toward anti-competitive behavior is a general
weakness of self-regulation,170 that concern is exacerbated in the context of
mutual fund regulation because of the industry’s relatively low start-up
costs and barriers to entry.171
A final reason for opposing the creation of an SRO for mutual funds is
the very practical issue of timing. The mutual fund reforms undertaken by
167. See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisors—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORD. J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 31, 36 (2005) (“A broker-dealer’s relationship with his customers is not, however, generally
considered a fiduciary one, unless the broker exercises investment discretion over the customer’s
account.”).
168. See FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 24, § 1.02[A][3] (“[B]oth the Advisers Act and the
1940 Act are based on the central premise that investment advisers are fiduciaries of their
clients.”).
169. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 476, 480 (1970) (observing that the 1940 Act responded to
Congress’s “concern[ ] about the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment
companies”). See generally Mahoney, supra note 43, 161–75 (describing the structure of mutual
funds and the inherent conflicts facing advisers and broker-dealers).
170. See generally Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV.
475, 487 (1984).
171. See The Mutual Fund Summit Transcript, 73 MISS. L.J. 1153, 1157 (2004) (emphasizing
that the investment company industry is one “that has very low barriers to entry, many new
entrants and a great deal of competition” (quoting Paul Hagga, former Chairman of the Investment
Company Institute)).
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the SEC in the wake of the trading abuse scandals have not been in place
for long and their effectiveness is still being evaluated. A drastic change in
the course of mutual fund regulation might undermine the investor
confidence that both the SEC and the industry itself has been working
diligently to restore.172
III. TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF MUTUAL
FUNDS
What then, if anything, can be done to improve the way in which
mutual funds are regulated? This final Part offers several suggestions. The
first constitutes a somewhat ambitious undertaking that would require
congressional action. But three more modest recommendations are also
advanced.
A. AN EXPANDED AND ENHANCED SEC
Assuming that further study demonstrates the desirability of more
frequent and/or more comprehensive inspections for mutual funds and their
advisers, one possibility would be for Congress to infuse the SEC with
additional resources to accomplish that end. Such additional funding could
bring the SEC more in line with the substantially lower examiner-to-assets
ratios, and the examiner-to-entity ratios, that exist for federal bank
regulators such as the Federal Reserve and FDIC.173 This observation
should not be viewed as an argument for complete parity with federal bank
regulator ratios. To be sure, many experts contend that the U.S. banking
industry is substantially over-regulated.174 But in light of the sheer volume
of money currently invested in mutual funds,175 a forceful argument can be
172. See Frankel, supra note 8, at 455 (“[D]ifferent, untested scheme of regulation” for mutual
funds may be perceived by the public as a sign of “reduced regulatory supervision.”).
173. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: SEC’S REVISED
EXAMINATION APPROACH OFFERS POTENTIAL BENEFITS, BUT SIGNIFICANT OVERSIGHT
CHALLENGES REMAIN, REP. NO. GAO-05-415 (Aug. 2005). The GAO reported that the then
$8 trillion in assets held by mutual funds and other investment companies at the start of fiscal year
2005 was “nearly double the $4.5 trillion in insured deposits at commercial banks and about equal
to the $8 trillion of financial assets at commercial banks.” Id. at 15. The GAO further reported that
in 2004, the SEC had 495 examiners managing 9,517 entities (including investment advisors
(8,535) and fund complexes (982)); the Federal Reserve had 1,223 examiners managing 6,970
entities (bank holding companies (5,863), state member banks (919), and foreign banking
organizations (188)); and the FDIC had 1,824 examiners managing 5,272 entities (FDIC-insured,
state-chartered institutions not members of the Federal Reserve System). Id. at 16.
174. See Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications 18 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and
Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olin%5Fcenter/papers/pdf/Jackson_521.pdf (“[O]ne area in which U.S. regulatory
intensity is unambiguously out of line” with other countries studied “is in the field of banking,”
and “[e]ven adjusted for total banking assets, the costs of banking regulation in the United States
is dramatically higher than the costs in any other [studied] jurisdiction.”).
175. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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made that the current system of inspection should be expanded and
enhanced.
Assuming an expanded and enhanced SEC mutual fund inspection
program is warranted, the additional monies to the SEC need not come from
general federal appropriations. Rather, following the “full cost recovery”
model of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, Congress could authorize the
SEC to retain the registration and filing fees that currently are paid by
mutual funds and their advisers and, if necessary to fund the enhanced
program, could authorize higher fees.176 Although Congress has rejected
self-funding proposals for the SEC in the past,177 this proposal would be on
a more limited scale and would preserve for Congress much of its coveted
control over the SEC’s budget.
Alternatively, Congress could authorize the SEC to charge mutual
funds or their advisers for the cost (or partial costs) of enhanced inspections
and examinations. Although these charges may be passed along to fund
shareholders in the form of reduced profits, the cost of an enhanced SEC
inspection program would be substantially lower than the creation of an
entirely new federal regulatory entity or a new self-regulator along the lines
of the NASD and NYSE.
B. OTHER REFORMS
1. Heightened Enforcement of Duties for Mutual Fund
Directors
Many scholars have emphasized that the trading abuse scandals
reflected a systemic failure of oversight by mutual fund boards.178 Although
the SEC has enacted a number of new rules to strengthen the oversight role
of mutual fund boards,179 the SEC can and should do a better job of holding
mutual fund directors to their statutory responsibilities.
In particular, the SEC should set forth clearer standards regarding the
minimal level of diligence that independent directors must demonstrate to

176. In May 2006, the SEC announced that the registration and transaction fees charged to
securities issues and other parties will be reduced by $1 billion in the fiscal year that begins
October 1. See SEC Press Release 2006-64, SEC Announces Billion Dollar Fee Cut to Benefit
Investors, May 3, 2006, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-64.htm. For
securities issuers, including mutual funds, this change amounts to a fee reduction of 71%. Id. But
if necessary to fully fund an enhanced mutual fund inspection program, this fee reduction could be
readjusted.
177. See Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L.
REV. 233, 233, 246–49, 253–56 (2004).
178. See, e.g., Looking Out for Investors Hearing, supra note 9, at 152 (prepared statement of
Professor Mercer Bullard) (“[A]ll of the frauds share a common element: the failure of mutual
fund boards to satisfy fundamental standards of compliance oversight.”).
179. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
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fulfill their role as “watchdogs” of the management of mutual funds.180 As
Professor Alan Palmiter points out in his article for this Symposium, a
comprehensive specification of board duties is noticeably absent from the
`40 Act, and thus it is generally state, rather than federal, law that
determines whether mutual fund directors are fulfilling their duties to
shareholders.181 But certain oversight and monitoring responsibilities—such
as those involving fund fees and performance as well as the pricing of
portfolio securities—are duties which are specifically set out in the `40 Act
and its rules and regulations.182 If SEC officials articulated their
expectations for independent directors more clearly and more directly,
independent directors may well increase their vigilance in response.
The SEC must also be more willing to initiate enforcement actions and
seek sanctions, including monetary penalties and officer and director bars,
against independent directors who flagrantly disregard their duties.183 As
Commissioner Roel C. Campos emphasized in a written dissent to a settled
proceeding against the four independent directors of Heartland Group
Funds,184 the failure to impose severe sanctions against outside directors in
the face of egregious misconduct undercuts the SEC’s recent initiatives to
strengthen the responsibilities of independent directors and “diminishes the
solemn obligation and duty of directors being vigilant in protecting the
interests of shareholders.”185 Independent directors who recklessly fail to
fulfill their oversight responsibilities may be liable under the broad
fiduciary provision in Section 36(a) of the ‘40 Act, and depending on the
particular facts and circumstances, may be liable for aiding and abetting
fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and Section
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act.186 Independent directors who act negligently
but not recklessly may be liable for violating Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of
180. See Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV.
133, 152 (2005) (“Currently, fiduciary duties are so broadly defined as to be almost
meaningless . . . . Strengthening fiduciary duties is one of the key elements remaining for effective
mutual fund reform.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Mercer Bullard, Rouge on a
Corpse Won’t Bring Mutual Fund Directors Back to Life, JURIST ONLINE (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/bullard1.php (“Neither the SEC nor the fund industry has set forth
standards regarding the minimum steps that fund directors must take to fulfill their fiduciary
duties to shareholders.”).
181. Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Boards: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 165–66 (2006).
182. See, e.g., Investment Company Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000); 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-1 (2006).
183. See Bullard, supra note 180 (criticizing the SEC’s enforcement program for failing to
demonstrate “that directors will be held accountable for the gross disregard of their duties”).
184. See In re Hammes, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,290A (Jan. 7, 2004) (Roel C.
Campos, Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8346a.htm.
185. Id. See also Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 62 BUS. LAW.
(forthcoming Nov. 2006) (“[T]argeted SEC enforcement actions against independent directors
could be a powerful incentive to animate the securities monitoring role.”).
186. See id.
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the Securities Act, provisions which do not require the SEC to make a
showing of scienter.
2. Returning OCIE Staff to the Policymaking Divisions
Another possible reform for the SEC to consider would involve
dismantling the OCIE and returning staff examiners to their respective
operating divisions.187 As others have noted, increased interaction among
the OCIE’s approximately 500 examiners for investment companies/
advisers and the 200 or so members of the staff of the Division of
Investment Management may allow problems and abuses to be identified
more quickly, which may result in more effective and efficient mutual fund
rulemaking.188
Although the views of the current SEC staff, in particular directors and
associate directors, should be sought and carefully considered, it is instructtive to note that several former Directors of the Division of Investment
Management have argued forcefully for a change. Specifically, these
directors emphasize that frequent contacts and exchanges between
examiners and division staff provides “interactive benefits” that result in
higher quality rules and policies.189
3. Continued Cooperation with the ICI
As noted above, often-cited advantages of self-regulation include
industry expertise and the greater sense of stake in the process that comes
when industry members participate in the development of rules.190 To these
ends, the SEC should heighten its interactions with the Investment
187. The OCIE was established in 1995 during the Chairmanship of Arthur Levitt. It was
formed by consolidating the inspection and examination programs authorized by the Exchange
Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Investment Advisers Act, responsibility for which had
previously been divided between the Division of Market Regulation and the Division of
Investment Management. See Lori A. Richards and John H. Walsh, Compliance Inspections and
Examinations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 52 BUS. LAW. 119 (1996).
188. Proposals for the dissolution of the OCIE are currently being considered both at the SEC
and in Congress. See Paul Akins, SEC Commissioner, Remarks before the IA Compliance Best
Practices Summit 2005 (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch
022806psa.htm (questioning whether it would “make more sense for us to reintegrate examiners
into the Divisions” and stating that “[a]n integrated structure could allow for interaction and
exchange between the folks who write and interpret rules and those who are on the frontlines
interacting with registrants and assessing their compliance with our rules”); Rachel McTague,
Securities and Exchange Commission: Fossella Bill Would Disband SEC’s OCIE, Redistribute
Agency’s Inspections Power, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 55 (2006) (reporting on H.R. 4618,
introduced by Rep. Vito Fossella (R.-NY)).
189. See American Enterprise Institute, supra note 8. Marianne Smythe, who directed the
Division of Investment Management from 1990–93, agreed with one audience participant who
characterized inspectors and examiners as the “eyes and ears” of division directors. And Kathryn
McGrath, who directed the Division from 1983–90, called attention to the disconnect that occurs
when examiners and policymakers interact infrequently. Id.
190. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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Company Institute (ICI), the principal trade association for mutual funds
and their investment advisers. In particular, the SEC should encourage the
ICI to take a more active role in proposing rules to the SEC for possible
adoption. The ICI should also be encouraged to increase the number and
frequency of the “best practice guidelines” it has developed for members.191
Indeed, whenever new policies and procedures would benefit funds by
boosting or restoring public confidence in the industry, the ICI should have
very strong incentives to work with the SEC in the development of rules
and guidelines for funds and their advisers.192 Thus, at least in the area of
rulemaking and guidance for investment companies and advisers, systematic restructuring of mutual fund regulation is not at all necessary in order to
capture several historical advantages of self-regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
With virtually every other household in the United States invested in
mutual funds, effective and efficient regulation of the mutual fund industry
must be a top national priority. But the creation of a new private
regulator—whether along the lines of SROs such as the NASD and NYSE
or the recently created PCAOB—would be a step in the wrong direction.
For the reasons set forth in this article, much more can be gained by
strengthening the SEC’s longstanding role as the principal overseer of
mutual funds and improving other aspects of the existing regulatory regime.

191. In 1999, for example, the ICI created an advisory group on best practices for fund
directors. The group issued, and the ICI’s Boards of Governors later endorsed, a report with
fifteen policy and procedural recommendations for possible adoption by mutual fund boards.
See Investment Company Institute, Report of the Advisory Group on Best Practices for Fund
Directors: Enhancing a Culture of Independence and Effectiveness (June 24, 1999),
http://www.ici.org/statements/ppr/ arc-pp/rpt_best_practices.pdf. In October 2003, the ICI’s Board
of Governors endorsed two additional recommendations to enhance and strengthen the
independence and effectiveness of mutual fund boards. See Press Release, Investment Company
Institute, ICI Board Recommends Two New Governance Standards; Urges Universal Adoption
of 17 Best Practices for Mutual Fund Directors, (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.ici.org/issues/dir/
03_news_best_practices.html#. The ICI also developed guidelines for the personal investment
activity of fund managers and advisory personnel. See Charles A. Fiumefreddo et al., Investment
Company Institute, Report of the Advisory Group on Personal Investing (May 9, 1994), available
at http://www.ici.org/statements/ppr/arc-pp/rpt_ personal_investing.pdf.
192. See Frankel, supra note 8, at 465 n.51 (“The SEC would greatly benefit from the ICI
comments on various regulatory issues and from surveys of its members. It is in the interests of
the ICI membership to supply such information and have an impact on its regulation.”).

